Friday, June 30. 2006
Hello Tina & Crew,
in addition to my previous email, see my answers below; if I have time I will also react to the many errors in the original piece, though it might just harm people which I do not want.
Please do not interprete these answers but print them in full, so they do not get different meanings.
Best regards,
Harry
The article is a response from other climbers to your guiding and account of the events when Thomas died. We'd like to offer you
a chance to response, pls answer the questions below at your convenience. Best, Tina & crew
1. Your main experience on Everest is a summit last year where you almost died on descent. What made you take on the responsibility to guide a special needs climber there this year?
Incorrect. I also
climbed 6 months before as part of a unguided, uncommercial Dutch team in September. I climbed as the only western teammember to camp 2, without oxygen, carrying all my own gear (20+kg backpack) and climbed and slept without oxygen and problems. Only because of the rest of the team giving up, I was not able to continue. But you know this as you published the stories.
Anyway, after many conversations by email, phone and in person, Thomas and I decided that we would make a good team and that with 2 good Sherpas we would make a chance of climbing Everest. We made clear agreements about safety and discussed the risks and both Thomas and I felt very good about the project. Besides, most of the guiding takes place below ABC, where people skills are much more important than the number of summits on Everest.
2. Rumors are that Thomas paid an above
normal fee - up to $70.000 USD. How much did he pay for his special aided climb? What motivated the high price?
Of course I do not have to share any detailed pricing
information, that's literally my business, maybe you should ask the people spreading the 'rumours' where they got their knowledge. Anyway, it is not far from the truth, but you could have calculated this yourself as it is the total of all costs: As I stepped down as an expedition leader I agreed with Alex that I would pay full expedition costs and act as a client for bookkeeping purposes, which Thomas paid for as part of the fee. So he paid for his full service climb with 4 bottles extra oxygen, my fullservice climb with 4 bottles extra oxygen, 2
personal climbing Sherpas with extra oxygen and my salary including my support from February onwards. It included also all expenses (drinks, meals, entrance fees, extra hotel nights etc) in Kathmandu, on the way and during (de)acclimatisation trips. You can do the calculations and compare it with what Scott or Russell would charge.
3. You reported that at 02.00, on the summit ridge, going on a flow of 2,5 lpm you were shocked to see that Thomas and yourself had used up 3/5ths of your first bottle in 2 hours and you lowered the
flow further. 2.5 liters per min is an already low flow level at 8400m for an inexperienced (not to mention handicapped) climber, what flow did you put Thomas on?
We had already noticed before (from 7000m) that the new regulators had mostly a stronger flow than indicated, for example 0.5l gave in
reality closer to 0.7l. I had already checked and determined this with Thomas and myself at NC. But we did not know yet if this was relative (i.e. 40% error) or absolute (0.2l error, independent of flow). I had brought an extra back-up regulator (last year's model), but that one turned out broken when I got it back after lending it to the EPP project after a request from Jamie. I only discovered this in high camp as it had been working (as it was used by Sherpas of the EPP and by myself in 2005) before.
The previous days Thomas had been climbing at 2l/ minute and had ascended faster than most other climbers, including Lincoln and most of Scott's team. Thomas had proven to be stronger than average, but still
we had planned to use 3l/minute for safety and speed. As you know most climbers use only 2l/minute. In the end we had changed the first bottle after 6 hours, the 2nd one after another 6 hrs as planned.
4. You wrote about the second step (on ascent), "I went first, pulled Thomas through the difficult sections, while Pemba pushed from below." Thomas sight was still OK at this time according to you, so why did he have to be pushed/pulled through a section usually managed without assistance by other climbers?
Objection your Honour... Incorrect & incomplete. You confuse 'the 2nd Step' as a 'section' with parts of the 2nd step as a 'section'. Most climbers need assistance at at least 2 parts of the 2nd step: when going up at the first featureless rocks and when going down to the start/top of the ladder. Thomas was no different; he had limited vision anyway, but it was still pitch dark so for him it was even more difficult to see the small ledges etc where you can put your crampons on for grip. It is easier to help sombody at that point than try to explain things in the dark. 90% of the 2nd step he did unaided.
5. Above the third step, around 8 hours climb from C3, you also discovered a hole in Thomas mask. Combined with the lowered flow at the exit crack - doesn't that indicate that
Thomas went on very low oxygen support since the very beginning of the climb?
Incorrect: Thomas had
been on normal to high flow since the beginning, he used a full 260bar bottle in 6 hours. The 2nd bottle was almost empty when he died, another 6 hours later. So he used an average of 1040l/360min= close to 3l/minute all the way. The hole was not here before as I inspected Thomas and his equipment many times on the way up, including during our rest stop just between the 2nd and 3rd Step. Very likely he had scratched his mask on the rocks of the 3rd step, just meters before and the result was immediate.
6. After the third step, according to yourself, Thomas was swaggering and walking towards the edge of the snowy hill. According to witnesses, Thomas launched towards the Kangchung face, suffered ataxia, swaying from side to side clearly using the rope for balance; he could not move his jumar from one fixed line to another and didn't answer questions. In cases like this, standard procedure is to suspect HACE and immediately turn back. Why did you take the decision to continue ascent?
If this is what they said, then they must have been suffering from AMS themselves. How can an Everest climber 'launch' himself anywhere at any time? Anyway, I have described this in my report very
clearly and have later sent this to Jamie who forwarded it to Scott and his clients as an addition:
"As you can even see on the attached pictures, Thomas had no problem climbing up the 3rd step. What you team mates saw there was Thomas almost walking off (close to where the pic was taken) as he suddenly lost vision. This was the moment when his oxygen mask was broken, Pemba immediately gave him his own (and got one from the dead climber at the traverse). When Thomas got oxygen again, his vision
returned and he could follow the track again. Again, climbing up without any
help. "
If the other climbers
were so very worried, it is very strange that none of them offered any help (wasn't needed).
Anyway, when Thomas got the other mask, his vision and relative stability returned and he was clear again;
we dicussed how he felt and he could continue without direct help. About the Jumar: we had been doing this since ABC without exception: Pemba or Pasang or myself would always change his jumar at anchors as a safety measure. Don't forget that his vision was fluctuating, and even though he could see surprisingly well, a mistake with the rope is easily made, so we always changed his jumar and carabiner for him. And he always swaggers when he walks, even at BC, see his own comments below at Q18.
7. Loss of coordination (ataxia), and staggering walk are the most significant signs of HACE, but also loss of speech
and judgment. BasecampMD writes "Immediate descent is the best treatment for HACE. Delay may be fatal. People with HACE usually survive if they descend soon enough and far enough, and usually recover completely." One witness says that she saw you talking on the radio/phone at this point - did you confer with Alex Abramov at this stage, the expedition doctor or anyone else before continuing towards the summit? If yes, did you describe Thomas symptoms and what did they recommend?
Partly correct. Yes, I talked to Alex, but at the traverse and after the call I did not continue to the summit. Besides that episode at the 3rd step Thomas had no symptoms of HACE, but still he was getting too exhausted and could endanger himself and others, so I decided to turn back and informed Alex. Alex had asked if we could continue but after I explained that in my view it was better to turn back, he agreed. Thomas could speak normally, we discussed with him and was clear but tired.
8. According to BasecampMD, as a rule of
thumb when at altitude, all sickness should be treated as AMS (followed by HACE or HAPE) unless there is another obvious explanation (such as diarrhea). How did you prepare yourself for a situation where you must distinguish between Thomas' pre-existing condition of a brain tumor and possible AMS?
This is very difficult for anyone of course and we had discussed this already before the start of the expedition and Thomas was aware of the risks. We tried as much as possible to make references: how much does Thomas 'swagger' (his natural way of walking when his vision is not 100%) at BC, at ABC, on snow vs rock. How fast does he go, when does he get tired etc. With this reference in mind he was clearly doing ok to very well until the last part.
9. Witnesses also state that at this point (above 3rd step) , you were about 20 feet beyond Thomas and there were no Sherpa's present (they were
retrieving oxygen spare parts by a fallen French climber). Thomas was wearing no goggles and his O2 mask was askew off to one side of his face for at least 40 minutes. Why did you allow your client to be without oxygen for such a long time at extreme altitude? Why didn't you make sure his oxygen mask (and goggles) were in place?
Incorrect. Simply not true. After Pemba gave his own mask to Thomas above the 3rd step, the 4 of us continued slowly but steadily to the rock traverse (Pemba without oxygen). Only there they went ahead to get the oxygen mask for Pemba, which he knew was there. Thomas was on oxygen all the time, but had taken off his goggles after I was discussing with him about he felt and discussed a possible retreat. That is one of the reasons I turned him back as I did not want him to climb without goggles, even though he said his vision was better without. So we put is goggles back on and descended. By the way, none of the other climbers stayed near Thomas for more than a minute as they all passed quickly, so they would never have been able to tell if anything had happened for 40 minutes?!? Very strange.
10. Why were you sitting 20 feet away from your client?
I do not recall being 20 ft away, but if it were so, then there must have been a good reason, like scouting the route ahead, getting
out of the wind (though there was not much) to make a radio call etc. It also proves that Thomas was well enough as he did not needed to be shortroped until that point, something that we did on descent for safety.
11. Did you give Thomas Dexamethasone and/or other altitude emergency drugs at any point? If yes - what, when and in what form?
No. See the 'reference' bit before.
He was doing as well as previous days, just tired and could descend without any help, unlike climbers like Lincoln, David Sharpe or Sele. Dex is not something to play around with and adminster at random in a tired body, so if not needed (climber can still walk, speak etc as normal) I will not give it.
12. You state that you continued but turned back 50 meters below the summit when Thomas suddenly became worse. You called your expedition leader with your decision - why didn't you contact Alex about the problems earlier?
There were no problems earlier, besides the mask incident which we solves on the spot. We were doing really well and within the time frame agreed with Alex. Thomas and I agreed beforehand that at the first sign of him not feeling totally good we would turn back. So we did as this time I could not see a direct cause as with the mask incident before.
This is what I sent to Jamie after he forwarded some questions, very likely from your 'witnesses':
"Only at the end of the snowslope/beginning of the traverse, when Thomas again starting to get out of balance and I could see no apparent reason (like the oxygen mask), I decided to turn him around (when your team passed us, while I was discussing with Pemba and Thomas.). This was to protect Thomas, my team, but also other climbers like your team as Thomas could have pushed someone else out of balance.
He was still strong enough to continue (and clearly said so), but at that stage I was not confident that he would make it down if we pushed on to the summit, something that would have been very easy for Pemba, Pasang and me as we were all very strong.
Thomas also climbed down the 3rd step, fully unassisted (just pointing out the steps/moves he should take/make), the same for the largest part of the 2nd step, he was not carried or lowered, he did most of the moves himself after being told what to do.. "
I had received no reaction on my replies to Jamie/his team from them until I read the article today.
13. What flow did you put Thomas on after turning around below the summit? Did you administer dex?
He was on constant flow and his oxygen was finished after 6 hrs, so effectively 3l/minute. See comments about dex at Q11.
14. On descent, at the bottom of the second step, witnesses say that you were approximately 25 feet away from Thomas when he started to collapse. Pemba sherpa was trying to hold him but Thomas fell and slid about 3 feet off the trail. Witnesses say that during all this time you did not move any closer to Thomas, who now was hanging in an unsustainable position with both his head and feet going downhill. Instead, you called Alex while other climbers called on their expedition leader to help Thomas up and check his airways and vital signs.
Scott Woolums arrived and got Thomas in a position where he could breathe. It was only at this point that you came over to Thomas - approximately 20 minutes from the time that Thomas had first started to collapse. Why had you been so passive earlier?
(HK):Totally incorrect. Please read my report. I was holding the rope tight for Thomas so he could pass this nasty little rock that is overhanging on the trail more easily. When he started sliding down, I still kept the rope as tight as possible while trying to hold Thomas (could I do this from 25ft? My arms are not that long I think). Only when I could no longer hold Thomas (nobody of the so-called witnesses did anything to help me, which would have been easier for them as that side of the little rock is nearly flat ground,
unlike the position where I was) as I was losing my balance myself, I had no choice of letting him slide down and slowly released the rope so he would not fall but slide to a rest. Then I climbed down. I could not turn Thomas around alone and could not descend safely further to his head though I tried both. I am not sure about the exact calls I made and when, but only together with Scott who came down to me (not before me as you mention) to help, we could manage to rig a system together and could get Thomas upright, also together. I was still very
strong at that point, but the exhaustion of the effort made that both Scott and I regurlarly had to stop and suck extra oxygen.
After we together confirmed his death, Scott left, I staed down with Thomas for some time, sent Pemba up to assist Lincoln who apparently was tired; changed my own oxygen bottle a litle bit ahead and continued down with Pasang.
15. How much oxygen did Thomas use during the climb and where did you change his bottles? How big where the bottles and what brand?
Oxygen used from North col. We only use new original 4l Poisk bottles, not refilled. But you know this as you published the picture of Alex & I with the bottles with info before.
Summitday: he used 2 bottles in 12 hours, see above: changed on top of second step on way up and below 2nd step when going down. We had a 3rd one ready for him (and one for me) for the descent to 8300m camp where we had a few dozen more, which we used for Lincoln's resque afterwards.
16. Thomas had recovered from serious brain surgery; one complication was that he went blind on altitude. If we understand it correctly, nobody knew what was going to happen with his health on Everest. Had you cleared this with doctors before the expedition? Did you stay in touch regularly with a doctor during the summit push? Did you have any standard medical checks to perform on Thomas ascent?
He would likely lose his vision gradually, he had tested this in a decompression room and had experienced it while climbing in Iran before, but of course he never had been to Everest before. We have the best doctor available in our team, Andrey Selivanov. He
checked Thomas almost every day, when possible, I checked Thomas as I could higher up. In his final interview (on camera) at 8300m, he is really feeling well and looking forward to the
summitday.
See answers at Q8.
1 7 . Witnesses mention severe negligence and passivity on your part, basically saying it killed Thomas Weber. Looking back, do you feel any responsibility for your client's death?
Those are very serious accusations. Jamie mentioned to me in Kathmandu that some of his clients were not happy with me. This is normal: even though Expedition guides and leaders like Jamie, Russel, Dan and Alex & I work together and help eachother out where possible, we notice that many times the clients look down on other groups, including their guides. This is basic sociology and psychology as they need to justify their own choices (of outfitter/guide, $ spent etc). So far nothing unusual.
But they had never seen Thomas climb before (or even see him hike between BC& ABC) and had totally no reference of how he normally climbed, his normal movements, how we ascend fixed rope as a team etc, which were no different on summitday but will appear strange to someone who has not sent it before.
This is what Thomas actually wrote me 2nd February after some long phone conversations about the plans and possible problems:
" I do caugh (cough) even on sea level, so sometimes the people has the impression that i suffered ams but it is not the case!! one needs to know this not to be misled. Since I am rather tall and slim when i walk slowly with backpack it sometimes looks as if i am unbalanced, again
sometimes people thought it is ams but it was never the case, guess it just looks like it due to my physics "
The 'witnesses' of course did not know this and never bothered to check on Thomas, not before, nor on summitday. They had told Jamie afterwards, 'that they would make sure I would not guide an 8000m peak again'. I guess that this slander is how they trying to do that.
Jamie did not agree with them by the way as he is much more experienced than his clients and knows how perception and emotions can change at 8000+m as well as the practical issues of guiding, so he tried to solve ('putting out the fire') the issues by acting as an intermediate and passing questions (theirs) and answers (mine) to eachother. I asked him if I could come in direct contact with his clients, but he deemed it better to act as an intermediary, so we did it this way. Actually we did interviews (on Camera) Scott and some climbers who were there at that moment, their stories, told by themselves are clearly different from what you
write.
I have been very active with Thomas all the way from sealevel, months before the climb, much more than with a regular client, even though he climbed faster and stronger than regular clients. Thomas was a very intelligent grown man who wanted to climb Everest and raise awareness for a charity and knew about the general risks of Everest and his specific risks. I turned him back at a point where 90% of all guides would have continued. Afterwards I have been told that very likely Thomas could just as easily have died of a stroke while taking off in an airplane (with a much more sudden drop in pressure) or even sitting at home. I am pretty sure that Thomas would have climbed Everest anyway, but with a less dedicated team (he told me about the replies he received from other companies who just wanted to send him up with maybe one personal Sherpa).
He mentioned that he chose for me for many reasons, of which the most important one was that I was the only one asking him questions in return and not just saying: "pay extra and we will do it."
I am very saddened by his death, as it not only means an unsuccessfull expedition (even if he would have summited)but most of all a loss of a very gentle and interesting man. I think I did the best I could do and therefore am not responsible for his death, in the end he is himself. Thomas and I are European, we do not have the claim culture of the US where you can blame
anybody but yourself for anything (see http://7summits.com/info/disclaimer.html).
Thomas accepted the risks and his own responsibility for anything that would happen on Everest.
1 8 . Will you continue to guide on Mount Everest?
Likely yes, though maybe from Nepal next year and very likely as a leader who will accompany as an extra guide if possible. It's not accidents like
these that stop me from guiding or leading as this is the risk of climbing Everest, it is the lies like mentioned above and in the article that make me sick of expeditions. But I guess that is exactly what these people wanted to accomplish.
Fortunately our own clients -who know me much better, many for years on different expeditions- are friendlier and it is reactions like this (received after the expedition and my report from a client who had to give up earlier) that provide the joy of guiding and helping people realise their dreams:
"I want to let you know how much we appreciate you and Alex and the 7summits. I appreciate your leadership and friendship and would not hesitate to go with you anywhere in the world. I trust you and feel for you. Losing clients it a hard thing and the grief will take some time to process. "
Thanks for the opportunity to set some things straight, hope this ends this discussion -which will have no winners anyway- and besides causing harm to both my reputation and the reputation of the 'witnesses', the family and friends of Thomas will be hurt more than you might realize.
As always, best regards from the Lowlands,
Harry
--------------------------------------------------------------
PS: I just reread the piece after sending out the above mail and noticed how they ended up with the '40 minutes'. Though incorrect still (we never stayed up ther that long in total), it explains the time they mention from their view. I have not removed my remark (or any other part) from my email above for completeness.
